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Where the Champsaur Commission
Has Got It Wrong
I. Introduction
One fairly unique feature of France
is that it hosts a large fleet of
nuclear reactors. It is owned by the
incumbent, EdF, and provides this
85-percent state-owned
enterprise with an economic
advantage to compete on price.
Moreover, because the energy mix
in continental Europe is
unbalanced, French nuclear power
generation benefits from an extra
scarcity rent which is likely to last
for a long time.1 Since the opening
of the retail market to competition
in July 2007, the allocation of this
rent and the survival of EdF
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competitors have been major issues
discussed by French lawmakers.
They are both addressed in a white
paper, issued this past April, that
has been called the Champsaur
commission report.2
T he Champsaur commissioncontains three main
recommendations: (1)
withdrawing the current retail-
administered tariff for business;
(2) maintaining retail-
administered tariffs for
households, and (3) introducing a
wholesale-administered tariff on
electricity from nuclear power
generation.
We welcome the fact that the
commission proposes to abandon
the so-called TaRTAM.3 As has
been rightly pointed out in the
commission’s report, this tariff for
business4 is very complex to
implement (and hence costly)
and freezes competition.
However, we have reservations
about the other two
recommendations. Our arguments,
explained below, are mainly based
on the classical two-prong
economic test5 to support a new
regulation: (1) assessing its costs
and benefits to ensure the latter
offsets the former, and (2)
comparing the recommended
regulation with alternative
instruments to verify that it is the
best choice.
II. The Perpetuation of
Administered Retail
Tariffs for Households
We are not convinced by the
reasons advanced by the
commission for maintaining
administered tariffs for
households.6 It is argued that
individual French consumers
are not mature enough. We
do not see why they would be
different from English or
German consumers, who
learned to enter into the retail
market many years ago. It
is also argued that smart metering
is in its infancy. We are afraid
the commission is making a
mistake here: low and flat
administered tariffs will hardly
promote the diffusion of
smart metering devices and
technologies.
A sound reason would berequired to justify the
perpetuation of current retail-
administered tariffs for French
households because their
drawbacks are severe. They
disincentivize electricity savings
and hence conflict with
environmental and climate
change policy7; they reduce
price competition between
suppliers; and insofar as they
are lower than market prices,
they discourage investments
in new power generation
capacity.
We recognize that retail-
administered tariffs for households
are a means to redistribute the
extra scarcity rent to consumers
and provides a way of increasing
their acceptance of nuclear power
generation. However, the
Champsaur commission is also
proposing a different instrument to
transfer the benefits of cheap
nuclear energy to consumers,
i.e., a cost-reflective regulated
wholesale tariff of the nuclear
kWh. If such constraint is
imposed at the wholesale level, a
competitive market would pass
the advantage on to consumers.
So it is not necessary to have two
instruments for achieving a single
goal.
As argued below, we do not
believe an administered price
at the level of nuclear generation
is advisable. But this does
not imply, in our view, that
administered retail tariffs
are necessary. In fact, the
reward can be transferred to
French citizens in other ways
than by reducing their
electricity bill:
First, they can be rewarded
as taxpayers because the French
state owns 84.7 percent of EdF,
and hence can extract most
of the extra scarcity rent as a
dividend.
Second, to make the reward
more visible, EdF extra profits can
be taxed and this tax can be
reallocated through a check
sent once or twice a year to
each household.8 To provide





test to support a new
regulation.
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electricity, the amount of the
check can be calculated on the
average household consumption.
Those who consume less than
the average will receive more
money than they would lose
with the increase in electricity
price owing to the abandonment of
tariffs; those who consume
more will be undercompensated.
Both will have incentives to
reduce their consumption because
their action will only
infinitesimally reduce the
check they will receive.
T hird, the extra scarcity rentcould be transferred as an
offset to the fixed charge that
distribution companies charge
domestic consumers.
A fourth option might consist in
imposing obligations on EdF which
provide an advantage both to
consumers and to society, such as a
quick and free delivery of new
smart meters to all consumers.
Because studies are lacking,
we do not exactly know which of
those four alternatives is the
best redistributive mechanisms.
We do know, however, that we
need:
1. To disconnect the individual
reward from the individual
consumption level. We are not
aware of theoretical or empirical
evidence showing a correlation
between households’ acceptance
disutility for nuclear power
generation and their level of
consumption that would
require giving a higher reward to
large consumers. Moreover,
knowing that on average high
electricity consumers have
higher incomes than low
electricity consumers, it does
not seem obvious to us that
sharing the historical nuclear rent
between households depending on
their consumption is especially
fair.
2. To limit the reward within a
time limit, since its aim is a transfer
of a comparative advantage,
originated by the stock of existing
nuclear generators, to households;
this can be done with a once-and-
for-all operation or spread over a
limited and definitely set length of
time.
We are concerned that the
perpetuation of administered tariffs
for households in addition to a
wholesale regulated tariff would only
make the market less open and the
regulation more complex and costly.
We therefore encourage French
lawmakers not to consider it necessary
to reward households for supporting
nuclear power generation by offering
them a regulated retail tariff which
is equivalent to a rebate pro rata to
their consumption. We recommend
instead that alternative mechanisms be
investigated, with their respective
drawbacks and advantages carefully
considered before one is selected.
III. Opening and
Regulating the Access to
Baseload Electricity
Generated by the
Historical Fleet of Nuclear
Reactors
The Champsaur commission
recommends opening access to
EdF nuclear facilities as follows:
- Setting an administered
cost-reflecting wholesale tariff. The
cost basis will include, inter alia,
operating costs, maintenance, and
dismantlement costs.9
- Limiting the quantity that
can be purchased at this tariff
according to the consumption
of purchasers’ clients who are
located in France. This quantity
per purchaser will be (1) set ex
ante depending on its customers
portfolio and its short-term
predictable development, and
(2) adjusted ex post – say, each
semester.10
- Restricting the administered
tariff to the production of existing
nuclear plants. Newly built
capacity such as Flamanville 3 will
be free to sell their output. The
same applies for exporting
baseload electricity from existing
plants.
Economists view forced access to
facilities that do not enjoy a natural
monopoly feature as a perilous
government intervention.11 It
requires highly intrusive and
costly regulation. It tends to
facilitate vertical and horizontal
cartels. It may reduce investments
in new capacity and innovation.
We support EC case law




facilities that do not
enjoy a natural
monopoly feature as a
perilous government
intervention.
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mandatory access to physical or
intangible assets.12 We do not
believe such circumstances are
encountered in this case.
T he Champsaur commissionrightly rejected applying the
so-called essential facility doctrine
to EdF’s nuclear fleet for access to
nuclear power generation.
According to this legal doctrine, an
input must be indispensable in
order to exceptionally justify
public intervention to force access.
This is not the case for nuclear
power plants because entry is
possible into the French wholesale
and retail markets without such
access. In fact, entry has occurred,
albeit at a modest level, in both
markets.13
The Champsaur commission
does not find exceptional
circumstances but only contingent
ones: ‘‘The consequences of history
and the considerations specific to
nuclear power justify a regulatory
intervention.’’14
W e are concerned with thisargument. Once accepted,
it could (and probably would) be
applied to a large number of
economic situations and several
industrial sectors in a number of
countries. It could start a run on
protectionist measures with the
aim of granting the population of
any country or region an advantage
stemming from the local
endowment of natural resources or
historic circumstances. It sets a too
low standard in justifying
government-forced access and can
severely discourage companies
from investing with the
perspective to gain a dominant
position by merit. As far as the
electricity sector is concerned, it
cannot be excluded, for instance,
that in 15 years new historical
reasons and unchanged specifics of
nuclear power generation would
require forcing access to plants that
will be built from now through
2024!
The commission’s objective in
opening and regulating access to
the nuclear power fleet is to
strengthen competition on the
retail markets: ‘‘A dedicated
regulation to baseload power
generation is [. . .] necessary [. . .] to
achieve effective competition in
supply.’’15 We are pleased to see
the members of the commission
endorse the high EC priority of
building competitive energy
markets. In fact, effective
competition on electricity and gas
markets in the European Union is a
critical ingredient to improve
security of supply and to
minimizing the costs of climate
change policy.16
However, we wonder whether
the recommended regulation to
achieve this goal is too costly and
too risky relative to its possible
benefit.
First, we are concerned with
the regulatory costs such a
recommendation would entail.
A large amount of information
will be necessary as for any cost-
reflective price setting. Moreover,
quantities will also have to be
set and this requires gathering
information on consumption and
clients. In addition, as was pointed
out by the commission, the
envisaged regulation is dynamic
and requires fine-tuning.17
More importantly, the regulation
could lead EdF to make less effort
to reduce its cost of production.
Lastly, lobbying and litigating
expenditures are likely to be huge.
In fact, influencing the regulator
or the government to set a more
favorable regulated price, or
expecting a judge to modify it,
will have a high payback. It would
therefore be rational for parties
with vested interests, especially
EdF and its competitors on the
supply markets, to spend a great
deal of effort and money in
lobbying and fighting for years
in French and in European courts.
This will result in allocating more
efforts and money in rent-seeking
than on investing and securing
energy supply.
Second, we are concerned
with the risk of regulatory
opportunism. The Champsaur
commission does not mention
which public body will decide
on the price. Will it be a specific
independent agency, the current
energy regulatory authority (CRE),
the ministry of economy and
finances? The Champsaur
commission rightly identifies the
risk of information asymmetry
The regulation could
lead EdF to make less
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between the regulated and the reg
ulator as a regulatory failure.18 It
ignores another one: the specific
interests of the regulator and the
government. One cannot assume
they are benevolent, that is, only
acting to maximize welfare. In the
recent past, the French government
has shown that it can refuse an
increase in regulated energy tariffs
or in grid access pricing even
though the increase in cost was
well documented. Future French
governments might have reasons
for manipulating the regulated
wholesale tariff. For instance, a
government may want to increase
the tariff to gain a larger dividend
to balance its budget; or conver
sely, it might want to decrease the
tariff before an election to alleviate
economic difficulties of electricity-
intensive industry and to gain
more support from small busi
nesses. Such government opportu
nism creates major uncertainty and
entails a risk of a financial hold-up.
It could therefore deter
investments.
Third, we are concerned with the
risk that the regulation would not
be as effective as expected in
strengthening competition. This
concern may seem puzzling
because we have recognized above
that today competition is
limited by the competitive
advantage EdF has due to its
production costs. However, it is
very important to acknowledge
that access regulation can facilitate
collusion among purchasers. It
provides occasions for competitors
to officially meet and discuss costs,
prices, and market shares.
Suppliers benefiting from the
energy access would rather sustain
a buyer cartel to get better
purchasing conditions than
compete in innovating on the
downstream market. Collusion
with EdF might also appear if the
administered price is low. As a
supplier EdF might benefit from
a high cost-price margin in retail
markets and so might its rivals.
Generally speaking, regulatory
authorities overlook the possible
anticompetitive effects of their
action. They are less experienced
with these matters than antitrust
authorities and competition is not
their unique objective.
I t is not obvious that the benefitof the envisaged regulation is
worth its costs. The production cost
of electricity is five to 10 times
higher than the cost of selling it to
consumers. Each time the
regulating production would result
in 1 percent inefficiencies (e.g.,
owing to disincentives to
incumbent cost minimization), a
strengthening of competition in
retail leading to a 5 percent
to 10 percent decrease in costs will
be needed to keep that regulation
welfare-enhancing. Moreover, the
adverse effects of the regulation
will affect all the production,
whereas the positive effects of the
gain in competition will mainly lie
in supplying small consumers, a
really smaller share of the market.
We are inclined to believe that the
Champsaur commission’s
recommendation to introduce a
wholesale-administered tariff on




administered tariff on baseload
nuclear power generation is a
disruptive and radical proposal.
Once implemented, its effects
would last at least a decade and it
will be difficult to eliminate this
regulation even if it proves to be
detrimental to the general welfare.
We have shown that such an
outcome is realistic, not merely
plausible. Therefore, it would not be
reasonable for French lawmakers to
adopt this recommendation
without better subjecting it to the
two-prong economic test to adopt a
new regulation is passed. The
Champsaur commission has not
provided sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the benefits of its
proposal offset its costs, and has not
proceeded to a sufficient
verification ensuring the
recommended regulations are less
costly than alternative instruments.
If French lawmakers decide on
adopting a wholesale-administered
tariff on nuclear power generation
without further investigation, we
recommend that they not maintain
Suppliers benefiting
from the energy access
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retail-administered tariffs for
households. We also recommend
that they pay great attention to the
design of the institutional frame
work of the regulation on nuclear
power generation, particularly (1)
to reduce the discretionary power of
government to intervene in the
regulated wholesale tariff, and (2) to
involve competition authorities. A
poorly designed framework could
lead to severe adverse conse
quences on investments in power
generation and in supply activities,
hence damaging security of supply
on the eve of a major investment
wave.&
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portefeuille prévisionnel des clients;
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commission nécessitera de mettre en
place un contrôle fin et continu par le
régulateur’’. See Champsaur Report,
supra note 2 at 18.
18. ‘‘Aujourd’hui, trois risques
identifiés co-existent : [. . .] l’absence
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